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Abstract
This paper attempts to understand what drives Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund managers to select
either active managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage their firms’ investment risks
[J. Bus. Venturing 4 (1989) 231]. Unlike U.S. venture capitalists that use active managerial monitoring to
gain private information in order to maximize returns [J. Finance 50 (1995) 301], JVCs have traditionally
used portfolio diversification to attenuate investment risks [Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha
Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital), Nihon Bencha Gakkai VC Seminar,
May 7]. We found that performance pay is positively related to active monitoring and that management
ownership is positively related to active monitoring and negatively related to portfolio diversification.
The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned about the
structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their investee-firm
entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-governing mechanism for
individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. When properly applied, equity ownership and
performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the strategic choices of managers.
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1. Executive summary
This paper looks at the agency contract that exists between venture capital (VC) firms and
their managers. We model the factors that drive Japanese venture capital (JVC) fund
managers to select either direct managerial monitoring or portfolio diversification to manage
their firms’ investment risks (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989). Unlike U.S. venture capitalists
that use direct monitoring to gain private information in order to maximize returns, JVCs
have traditionally used portfolio diversification to manage investment risks. However, in
recent years JVCs have used a mix of different strategies, including direct managerial
monitoring. This change in industry practice provides an opportunity to test the applicability
of agency theory in the JVC industry.
We theorize that the corporate affiliation of a JVC, compensation structure for its
investment managers, and managerial stock ownership will predict whether an active
(hands-on monitoring) or passive (portfolio diversification) risk management approach is
chosen by the JVC fund manager. We did not find any relationship between the corporate
affiliation and risk management approach. However, we found that compensation schemes
and management ownership strongly affect a JVC’s choice of risk management approach.
Specifically, we found that performance pay is positively related to direct monitoring and that
management ownership is positively related to direct monitoring and is negatively related to
portfolio diversification.
The central roles played by compensation schemes and management ownership are
congruent with the extant literature in agency theory. In fact, the results suggest that standard
agency theoretic formulations may be generalized to the special case of Japanese venture
capitalists, even though they are structured quite differently from their U.S. counterparts.
Our results also suggest that direct monitoring is a multidimensional activity composed of
direct intervention, as well as boardroom governance, as both were highly correlated to the
latent governance construct. In this respect, JVCs seem to behave much like their U.S.
counterparts.
The managerial implication of our study is that venture capitalists should be as concerned
about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for their
investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-
governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. However,
such schemes must be sensitive to the organizational context in which they are applied. Our
study shows that when the organizational culture puts a premium on distributive justice, as
with many large Japanese corporations, some forms of contingent compensation such as
equity ownership may not be easy to implement. On the other hand, when properly applied,
equity ownership and performance-based pay can have powerful influencing effects on the
strategic choices of managers.
That said, we cannot ignore the fact that the ultimate objective of VC investing by large
Japanese corporations, indeed even the venturing arm of many U.S. corporations such as
Intel, is not always the maximization of investment returns, but other strategic objectives such
as the access to leading edge technologies or future business opportunities related to the
parent’s core businesses. In addition, because a large corporation has to deal with a diverse set
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of internal and external stakeholders, its venture unit’s focus on value maximization could be
diluted. For example, the timing to harvest an investment will depend on whether the parent
corporation is looking for technological spillovers (late harvest) or maximizing the efficiency
of its cash flows (early harvest). Trying to simultaneously discharge these objectives will
probably result in the under-performance of the venturing unit. The upshot is that if large
corporations want their venturing units to maximize returns on investments, they are probably
better off spinning them off as independent units, with returns driving performance
incentives, measures, and even equity ownership structures.
2. Introduction
What is the impact of the structure and governance mechanisms of a VC firm on its risk
management approaches? To answer this question, we build an agency model of the
relationship between the JVC firm and the managers who make these choices (Robbie et
al., 1997; Gompers and Lerner, 1999; Baker and Gompers, 1999).
JVCs, unlike their U.S. counterparts that use active monitoring to attenuate portfolio risks
(Lerner, 1995), have traditionally used a passive approach—portfolio diversification (Ham-
ada, 2001). However, the recent increased use of active monitoring by JVCs has allowed us to
compare the factors that drive the choice of these risk management approaches (Gorman and
Sahlman, 1989; Gompers and Lerner, 2001a). Briefly, our model relates the corporate
affiliation of a JVC, compensation structure for its investment managers, and VC firm
managerial stock ownership to the choice of active (hands-on monitoring) or passive
(portfolio diversification) risk management approach. To examine this model, the paper
proceeds as follows. First, we review the JVC industry, followed by the theoretical model.
Then, we discuss the methods and results, concluding with some observations on the
implications of our findings and directions for future research.
3. The VC industry in Japan
The Japanese VC industry is structurally different from the U.S. VC industry and thus allows
us to test the generalizability of commonly used theoretic approaches. Because the institutional
environments in the U.S. and Japan differed significantly, their VC industries developed in
different directions. First, because JVCs could not legally be structured as limited liability
partnerships (a common practice in the U.S. and Britain), many were established as stock
company subsidiaries or affiliates of larger securities companies, banks, and other financial
institutions. Among the largest 100 JVCs, for example, over 70% are subsidiaries of financial
institutions or other large companies (Nikkei Financial Journal, July 7, 2000). The largest of
these is JAFCO, the VC partnership betweenNomura Securities, Sanwa Bank, and Nippon Life
that grew from US$1.5 billion in 1999 to US$1.8 billion by March 2001 in total investments.
The investment managers of these JVCs are usually employees with financial expertise rather
than professional VC experience that have been transferred from their parent companies (see
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Muraguchi’s commentary on this in Harmon, 2000). Such managers are more familiar with
large-firm investing than VC-equity financing techniques.
Prior to 1999, there were no dedicated exit markets such as the NASDAQ for VC in Japan.
Because of this, JVCs, unlike their U.S. counterparts, confined their investing to established
small and medium-size enterprises (SMEs). This was mostly to avoid the high IPO costs
usually associated with early-stage companies trying to list on the main board (Hata and
Higashide, 2000). Because these established SMEs did not require extensive handholding and
expert advice, they were also not actively monitored by their venture funds (Hamada, 1998).2
Finally, because most Japanese SMEs were financed by bank debt they did not require the
type of risk capital provided by VCs, so there were few investment opportunities for VC firms
(Hata and Higashide, 2000; Prowse, 1996). In sum, these institutional constraints may have
shaped the JVC’s choice of risk management approach and thus its relationships with investee
firms.
The institutional environment for JVC shifted in 1999. First, the Market of the High-
Growth and Emerging Stocks (MOTHERS) was established on the Tokyo Stock Exchange in
1999, and the Japan NASDAQ was born in 2000.3 These exchanges lowered the listing
requirements for new stocks, which attracted more venture capitalists that now perceived an
exit path for their investments (Hata and Higashide, 2000). Second, the influx of capital
fueling the Internet stock boom in the United States between 1998 and 2000 led to the entry
of many VC companies established by the former investment managers of large established
JVCs and foreign VC funds.
The newly established independent JVCs, together with the traditional large financial and
nonfinancial institution affiliated JVCs afford us the opportunity to take up the challenge
posed by Elango et al. (1995) and Sweeting and Wong (1997) in which they argued that the
heterogeneity of VCs calls for further refinement and testing of the extant theory.
4. Theory and hypotheses
A typical study in VC research examines the conflict between the VC with claims over the
residual cash flow rights of a venture firm and the entrepreneur who controls those rights
(Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Kaplan and Stromberg, 2002; Sapienza et al., 1996; Admati and
Pfleiderer, 1994). Here, the VC protects its claim through such devices as investment staging
(Bergemann and Hege, 1998; Gompers, 1995), active direct monitoring in the boardroom
2 Usually, such active managerial monitoring approaches are used by U.S. VCs to increase the IPO value of
the VC-backed firm by infusing managerial discipline and network contacts that may be missing from early-stage
ventures (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Admati and Pfleiderer, 1994). Thus, the exit value of the firm may be as
dependent on the level of managerial support and social capital provided by the VC as it is on the firm’s
managerial competence, technology, and capital market conditions (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989; Manigart et al.,
1994; Lerner, 1995).
3 The Japan-NASDAQ is now operated as Hercules within the Osaka Securities Exchange, after the exit of
NASDAQ in late 2002.
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(Lerner, 1995; Baker and Gompers, 2000), operational control (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989;
Baker and Gompers, 2000), and even shareholder agreements that confer ultimate authority to
replace the CEO (Sahlman, 1990; Baker and Gompers, 2000).4
In this paper, we extend the literature by focusing on the relatively unexplored relationship
between the VC firm and its risk management choices (Robbie et al., 1997; Sapienza and
Gupta, 1994). While standard financial portfolio theory says that VCs should be indifferent to
the unsystematic risks in a diversified portfolio, Manigart et al. (2002) and others have argued
that VCs do not behave like ordinary investors. For example, Wright and Robbie (1998)
argue that portfolio specialization (by industry, technology, or stage of growth) attenuates a
VC’s ability to fully diversify its unsystematic risks, forcing it to rely instead on the active
monitoring of its investee firms.5
A public market for equity would normally attenuate agency problems because the value of
managerial effort is revealed in the price of the stock, which forms the basis for a discipline
mechanism.6 In a private equity market such as VC, where the value of entrepreneurial effort
is more difficult to price, VCs rely on active or ‘‘hands-on’’ monitoring to obtain private
information (Sweeting and Wong, 1997; Fiet, 1995; Gompers and Lerner, 2001b). The private
equity market is well developed and thus there are more active flows of nonprice information
in the United States than in other markets so such strategies are productive. The private equity
market is relatively new and thus less developed in Japan. Therefore, such measures are more
costly as they require greater attention on the part of the JVC fund manager. Therefore, these
managers may also choose to reduce the costs of active monitoring through portfolio
diversification, i.e., the passive or ‘‘hands-off’’ approach (Sweeting and Wong, 1997).
Thus, JVC managers face two choices on how they will manage the investment risks of
their portfolio. However, information-processing theory suggests that a JVC will be less able
to manage a more diversified portfolio of stocks if it chooses an active investment strategy.
We recognize that active monitoring and portfolio diversification need not be mutually
4 Cable and Shane (1997) argue that a classic agent–principal approach is inappropriate because ownership
and control are not completely separate in VC-backed entrepreneurial firms. Instead, they proposed a prisoner’s
dilemma (bilateral bargaining) model of the VC–entrepreneur relationship (p. 168). We note that their argument
does not address the theoretical implications of the separation of cash flow and control rights, which Jensen (1993)
considers as the necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of an agency problem. The ownership of cash
flow rights by an agent is not sufficient to eliminate the agency problem—one reason why stock options do not
work very well! Rather, it is the gap between cash flow and control rights that matters. Therefore, an entrepreneur
who has 51% cash flow rights but 100% control rights will still act as a self-maximizing agent at the expense of
the VC, for whom the value of the cash flow rights depends 100% on the entrepreneur’s effort. A better analytical
framework is the incomplete contracts (i.e., agency theory) formulation, which allows for the partial ownership of
cash flow rights with full control rights by the agent (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990).
5 Manigart et al. (2002) and others have noted that postinvestment monitoring creates value in ways other than
reducing managerial expropriation, such as in helping to identify additional business opportunities, in their
portfolio firms. In this paper, we do not attempt to separate the sources of value creation as this is not the focus of
the study nor does its consideration change the underlying theoretical model. In short, postinvestment monitoring
incurs a nontrivial cost with the potential for positive net present value creation, regardless of its sources.
6 We realize that this would not solve all agency problems, as information asymmetry still exists although to a
smaller degree.
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exclusive choices.7 In fact, a risk neutral JVC firm can diversify by holding a basket of funds
(i.e., a portfolio of investment portfolios) each of which is actively monitored by a VC
manager. However, given scarce resources, a risk adverse JVC manager must consider the
trade-offs between the active and passive risk management strategies. Because the costs of
monitoring and enforcement are nontrivial, a JVC manager has to specialize on a few
investments to maximize the future value of the investment portfolio (Gupta and Sapienza,
1992; Gompers and Lerner, 2001b). However, because the stability of future cash flows from
employment depends on the returns from his investments, this risk-adverse JVC manager
would have a greater incentive to diversify the portfolio (Sweeting and Wong, 1997; Kaplan
and Stromberg, 2002). Therefore, in our model, the JVC managers will only choose the active
direct monitoring if they are given the incentives to do so.
In Fig. 1, we depict the relationship between a JVC firm’s status (independent or corporate
affiliate), JVC fund managers’ compensation and degree of equity ownership in the JVC firm,
and the JVC manager’s choice in risk management strategy, defined narrowly as active
monitoring or portfolio diversification. Based on empirical observation and theory we assume
that JVCs that are affiliated with large financial institutions will face fewer pressures to
maximize returns on investments, given the traditional emphasis on stakeholder value
maximization and social stability (Sullivan, 1992).
4.1. Corporate affiliation
The traditional corporate structure in Japan is a keiretsu organized around main banks (e.g.,
Mitsubishi) or industrial firms (e.g., Matsushita). These keiretsu or main bank investors hold a
large portion of shares in Japanese firms.8 Such shareholdings do not represent true
investments, but rather are relationship guarantees (Hudley and Jacobson, 1998; Nakatani,
1984). This is particularly true when subsidiary firms are created to promote the interests of
the parent, such as the case with corporate affiliated VC firms. For example, a financial
institution may book a high-risk real estate loan with a VC subsidiary to protect its balance
sheet from future losses. It may further generate loan businesses from the firms into which it
7 We thank a reviewer for raising this important point.
8 According to a study by NLI Research Institute, such ‘‘stable’’ shareholdings accounted for 38% of the total
value of Japanese stocks in 1999, compared to 48% in 1992.
Fig. 1. The agency relationships between VC firms and VC managers.
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has made VC investments. Finally, it may underwrite the same firms during their initial public
offerings (Prowse, 1996; Gompers and Lerner, 1999). In these examples, profit maximization
of the venture is secondary to the business interests of the parent corporation (Manigart et al.,
2002), which may be to reduce operational risk, stabilize trading relationships, or enhance
revenue growth. Consequently, VC fund managers working for such companies may not feel
the same pressures as their independent counterparts to maximize return on investments by
carefully managing their investment risk though the active monitoring of investee firms.
Thus, they may choose the lower yielding but more predictable passive risk management
strategy of portfolio diversification.
On the other hand, nonaffiliated or independent JVC firms act more like their U.S.
counterparts and thus are likely to focus on maximizing returns on investments. This increases
the pressure on fund managers to look for riskier but higher yielding investment strategies
(Wright and Robbie, 1998; Robbie et al., 1997; MacMillan et al., 1988). These strategies will
likely involve focusing on particular industries or venture stage (seed, first or second
financing round, pre-IPO, etc.), which requires JVC managers to expend effort in direct
monitoring and providing managerial support and functional expertise to portfolio firms
(Gupta and Sapienza, 1992). Therefore, everything else being equal, the organizational
affiliation of a JVC manager will have a systematic impact on their choice of risk management
approach such that:
H1a: Affiliated JVC fund status is negatively related to active managerial monitoring.
H1b: Affiliated JVC fund status is positively related to portfolio diversification strategies.
Since the variable ‘‘affiliate’’ was set up as binary, the implied alternative hypotheses to
H1a and H1b would refer to the relationships between independent status and risk manage-
ment approaches.9
4.2. Compensation
Contingent compensation is designed to elicit agent behaviors that are consistent with the
objectives of the principal (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Ivancevich, 2001; Baker and
Gompers, 1999). Therefore, a JVC firm that compensates its managers on the basis of
investment returns will prefer active direct monitoring as a risk management approach.
Venture capitalists create value by bringing managerial and operational expertise to the
investee firm. This allows a VC to reap higher returns from the overall portfolio by positively
altering the risk–return yield curve, relative to an uncorrelated portfolio of assets. However,
9 Thus,
H1ao: Nonaffiliated JVC fund status is positively related to active managerial monitoring
whereas
H1bo: Nonaffiliated JVC fund status is negatively related to portfolio diversification strategies.
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classic span-of-control limitations (Gittell, 2001) ensure that for the VC managers to be
effective, they can only oversee a few firms in related industries (Gorman and Sahlman, 1989).
For the individual VC manager, such specialization increases the risk of loss to his or her
human capital, as it is not diversified (Sapienza and Gupta, 1994). However, this risk can be
indemnified10 so that the VC managers can still expect their human capital to have positive
NPV. Therefore, JVC managers who are compensated on venture performance will likely
choose the hands-on monitoring approach to maximize the performance of the VC firm,
which in turn will maximize the return on their human capital investments in the firm.
There is no incentive for JVC managers to invest in direct monitoring, as this represents an
irrecoverable commitment to the VC firm, if they are not compensated for the risks of doing
so and if the return on their investment is not higher than an alternative investment in
shirking. Instead, they will choose a safer risk management approach, which is portfolio
diversification, and invest their attention somewhere else, i.e., consume on the job.
In general, corporate affiliated JVCs tend to follow the compensation practices of their
parent corporations. In Japan, this still means that employee seniority forms the basis for
determining pay scales. For example, Venture Club (October 2001) reports that most fund
managers are not compensated on portfolio performance (e.g., capital gains from the successful
IPO of investee firms), but rather on seniority. Therefore, everything else being equal,
H2a: JVC use of performance-based compensation for fund managers is positively related to
active monitoring strategies.
H2b: JVC use of performance-based compensation for fund managers is negatively related to
portfolio diversification strategies.
4.3. Managerial ownership
It has been argued that managers are more likely to maximize shareholder wealth when they
also own equity in the firm (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Hill and Snell, 1989; McConnell and
Servaes, 1990). Similarly, VC senior managers who own equity in their own firms would
behave in a manner that maximizes the efficiency of their firm’s investments. This argument is
especially relevant for JVCs because they are usually structured as stock companies owned by
other firms, financial institutions, and/or the senior managers of VC firms. Without equity
ownership, the effectiveness of managers’ monitoring activities has a smaller impact on their
personal wealth (Jensen, 1984). Therefore, agency theory would predict that these managers
would be less motivated to monitor their investee firms, suggesting that the owner–managers
of VC firms are more motivated to use active monitoring of their investee firms.
In many ways, equity-based and performance-based compensation have the same effect as
aligning the interests of the managers with those of the firm in which they have equity
(Jensen, 1984). If fund managers hold part of the equity of the JVC, then their total
compensation is also driven by the performance of the JVC.11 The difference is that equity-
10 Examples include base salaries, lower hurdle triggers for payouts, golden parachutes, etc.
11 We thank an anonymous reviewer for pointing this out.
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based compensation is typically long term (managers are not free to buy and sell stock in the
firm without some constraints such as vesting periods, hurdle rates, etc.), whereas perform-
ance-based compensation, in the form of cash bonuses, are paid immediately. Some forms of
equity compensation also require a personal commitment of cash from the managers so that
they have a vested interest in the firm. The rewards from equity ownership come as a result of
the achievement of the strategic goals of the firm. Equity ownership is designed to foster an
ex ante long-term view. On the other hand, performance-based compensation is ex post and is
designed to encourage the achievement of a defined set of operating goals. In sum, equity
ownership and performance-based pay attempt to achieve an alignment of interests but
operate in qualitatively different ways.
Some have argued that owner–managers may favor portfolio diversification because their
personal wealth is tied up in the firms they manage (Fama and Jensen, 1983; Amihud and
Lev, 1981; Jensen, 1984). However, the VC literature is clear in its assertion that owner–
managers of VC firms, acting as entrepreneurs, are more interested in maximizing the upside
potential of their investments since their tolerance for risk, stemming from specialized
knowledge, is higher (Fiet, 1995; Sapienza and Gupta, 1994). Therefore,
H3a: JVC equity ownership by fund managers is positively related to active monitoring
strategies.
H3b: JVC equity ownership by fund managers is negatively related to portfolio diversification
strategies.
5. Data and variables
5.1. Sample
The unit of analysis is the JVC firm. Data on JVCs were collected through structured
interviews, conducted between December 2000 and February 2001, of JVC managers.
Additional secondary data were collected from published sources listed below. The firms
were chosen from the largest 106 JVCs listed in the Nikkei Kinyu Shimbun (Nikkei
Financial Journal, July 2000). Because large JVCs dominate the industry in Japan—the
top 10 JVCs accounted for over 60% of total VC investments in 2000 whereas the top 30
accounted for 90% of the total (Hamada, 2001)—we believe the selection bias, if any, was
minimal.
From this list, we first categorized VC firms by their affiliations such as securities,
company-affiliated, bank-affiliated, insurance company-affiliated, nonfinancial-firm-affili-
ated, and independent based on the ownership structure. Then we contacted the top 5 to
15 VC firms in each category or about 70 VC firms in total for interviews, collecting data
from 40 firms (about 57% response rate), representing about 40% of the top 106 largest JVCs.
Thirty-nine were based in Tokyo while one was from Kyoto. There are 63 VC firms reported
in the top 106 with head offices in Tokyo, so our sample of 39 VC firms was representative of
the population of Tokyo-based VC firms.
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The final sample of firms was categorized into 25 affiliated and 15 independent VCs.
Affiliated VCs are those in which a majority owner is a corporation (i.e., securities company,
bank, insurance company, or nonfinancial firm), whereas independent ones are those not
controlled by another firm.
5.2. Variables
5.2.1. Dependent variables
The two dependent variables used in this study, active monitoring and diversification, were
measured as follows.
Active monitoring is a multidimensional construct measured as the average investment
amount per portfolio firm compared to total fund size (amtfirm), the ratio of the number of
firms to which a VC firm sends a representative director (director), and the degree of direct
managerial supervision (active).
Several studies have looked at the optimal size of investments per VC manager (e.g.,
Jaaskelainen et al., 2002). Cumming (2001) showed that the type of venture fund and its
capital structure, among other factors, had a systematic impact on the size of the portfolio.
Antecedents that lead to more efficient information processing would support larger
portfolios. The Cumming (2001) study also implies a trade off between the size of a portfolio
and the efficiencies to be gained from risk reduction. Therefore, everything else being equal, a
larger investment in each portfolio relative to total firm size (amtfirm) exposes the VC firm to
greater financial risks since the potential loss from each portfolio is now greater. Thus, the
larger the investment amount, the greater the incentives to closely monitor the investee firms
to attenuate the probability of catastrophic losses.
Director measures the degree a JVC is able to bridge the information asymmetry that exists
between the VC manager and itself by creating more information conduits into the board-
room. As Prowse (1996) argues, board representation is a form of direct control exercised by
a VC.
Active is defined as the day-to-day supervision of management and is measured as the
fraction of portfolio firms in which the VC firm has direct managerial supervision. Each
interview respondent was asked to provide his/her own assessment of his/her own VC firm in
terms of their degree of involvement in managerial supervision. Based on the information
given by the interview respondents, active was categorized into the following categories:
1 = no involvement, 2 = active involvement for less than 10% of portfolio firms, 3 = active
involvement for 10–30% of portfolio firms, and 4 = active involvement for over 30% of the
portfolio firms. Each category shows how much of its portfolio firms, a VC firm is involved
in active management. Sahlman (1990) views this as another form of direct control. These
data were collected directly from structured interviews.
Diversification was measured in two ways. Due to limitations on data access and
information, we were not able to calculate Herfindahl or entropy measures of portfolio
diversification. Thus, we used a multidimensional measure of diversification as a way to
achieve construct validity. By sensitizing this measure to the VC industry in Japan, we
believe that what we lacked in generalizability, we compensated for in face validity.
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First, the construct was measured as a JVC’s investment policy regarding diversification
into information technology (IT)-related sectors. IT is thus the proportion of investments
in IT-related sectors to total portfolio value. A higher ratio indicates a greater concen-
tration of investment in IT-related sectors, or conversely lower diversification into other
sectors. The reason we used the IT sector is that during the period of the study, IT
represented the fastest growing sector for private equity investments in Japan. Many VC
firms were founded to exploit opportunities perceived in the IT boom. Therefore, a policy
of only investing in that sector indicates a focus on high mean-variance outcomes, while a
policy of hedging against the sector by diversifying into non-IT sectors indicates a more
conservative investment approach. We also measured the ratio of early stage investment
amount in total investment amount (early stage). We define firms in early stage as those
operating for less than 3 years from founding. A higher ratio shows a greater focus on
investment in early stage firms, and thus indicates less diversification in terms of
investment stage. The data were collected from Venture Club articles and corroborated
by the structured interviews.
Although these measures were unconventional, our later results appear to be broadly in line
with the extant literature—diversification is a means of risk reduction and therefore not
rewarded in pay for performance schemes—and thus, the measure at least has some degree of
face validity, although a standard approach would have led to more robust tests.
5.2.2. Independent variables
Affiliation is a dummy variable that shows whether a JVC is affiliated with another firm
through equity ownership. The variable is coded 1 if the JVC is affiliated to a corporate parent
and coded 0 if it is an independent entity. Pay is also a dummy variable that shows whether a
JVC uses performance-based compensation. If a VC firm uses performance-based pay, we
assigned 1, otherwise it takes the value of 0. The data were culled from interviews, Venture
Club articles, and the Nikkei Financial Journal.
Managerial ownership is the share of total equity held by investment managers in their
own VC firm. There are a few VC firms in our sample where the VC managers owned
100% of their own firm’s equity (see Table 1), which makes them akin to business angels. In
such firms, we can argue that there is no agency problem. However, we did not exclude
these JVC firms because we wanted to maximize the variance in our sample to more
properly explore the effects of managerial ownership on JVCs’ investment choices. The data
were collected from Venture Club articles and documents provided by each VC firm after
their interviews.
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics for the variables while Table 2 shows the bivariate
correlations of the variables. Measures 1 to 5 in Table 2 are the dependent variables while
measures 6–8 are the independent variables. From Table 1, we can see that some JVCs send no
directors to their investee firms, while there is at least one JVC that sends its own managers to
92% of its portfolio firms. We can also tell that over 60% of our JVCs are affiliated with a
financial institution or other company while less than 40% are independent.
Table 2 shows the bivariate correlations of the variable. Affiliate, pay, and mgtown are
measures corresponding to the latent constructs: affiliate, pay for performance, and manage-
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ment ownership, respectively. IT and early stage are measures of the dependent latent
construct portfolio diversification. Amtfirm, director, and active measure the dependent latent
construct active monitoring.
This table shows several interesting relationships. First, it shows that amtfirm is highly
correlated with director and active, which suggests that a larger investment exposure to a single
firm leads a JVC to increase its monitoring through director transfer and hands-on approach.
Also, affiliate is negatively correlated with and pay and mgtown are positively correlated with
both director and active (active monitoring variables). Furthermore, affiliate is negatively
correlated with and pay and mgtown are positively correlated with early stage, which is one of
the diversification variables. These relationships appear to suggest that our hypothesized
relationships can be supported.
Table 2
Correlation table
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
1.Amtfirm 1.000
2.Director .547** 1.000
3.Active .434** .557** 1.000
4.IT .073 .097 .225 1.000
5.Early stage .155 .399* .584** .516** 1.000
6.Affiliate  .224  .648**  .520** .052  .335* 1.000
7.Pay .274 .478** .801**  .012 .542**  .568** 1.000
8.Mgtown .298 .772** .612** .199 .567**  .768** .537**
* P<0.05.
** P<0.01.
*** P<0.001.
Table 1
Descriptive statistics
Minimum Maximum Mean S.D.
Investment per portfolio firm/total fund size
(amtfirm) (in hundred million yen)
.06 10.00 2.061 2.656
Number of firms with VC rep/total number
of portfolio firms (director) (%)
.00 92.00 13.825 24.494
Degree of direct VC supervision (active): 1–4 1.00 4.00 2.625 1.170
Amount of investment in IT sector/total
portfolio value (IT) (%)
10.00 100.00 57.917 25.617
Amount of investment in early stage firm/total
portfolio value (early stage) (%)
10.00 100.00 42.917 25.729
Is the JVC affiliated with another firm through
equity ownership? (affiliation): binary
.00 1.00 .625 .490
Performance-based pay for VC managers?
(pay): binary
.00 1.00 .500 .506
Share of VC firm equity owned by
VC managers (mgtown) (%)
.00 100.00 20.150 34.299
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6. Analytical method
Because we conducted structured interviews to obtain fine-grain data from the field, we
ended up with a relatively small sample of 40 firms. Traditional nonparametric analysis is
usually indicated for hypothesis testing of small sample sizes. However, because our model
includes multidimensional latent constructs, standard nonparametric analysis is not the
appropriate analytical strategy. Instead, we used partial least squares (PLS) with boot-
strapping, a nonparametric technique specifically designed to deal with our data limitations
and research model (Chin and Newsted, 1999).
PLS is a confirmatory, second-generation, multivariate analytical technique (Fornell,
1987). Like structural covariance analyses such as LISREL and AMOS, PLS allows for
the examination of both latent (theoretical) and manifest (measured) variables. LISREL-type
programs and PLS are similar in that they include the following elements: (1) modeling of
observation error; (2) involvement of theoretical and empirical variables; (3) confronting
theory with data; and (4) combining theory with data (Fornell, 1987). However, LISREL-type
programs are a special case of PLS that assumes that measures are all normally distributed.
Alternatively stated, PLS is a nonparametric method.
Consequently, PLS offers two important advantages for this study over the more
familiar structural covariance analytical methods: (1) PLS can be used on very small
data sets, since we are not relying on a sufficient sample to invoke the central limit
theorem (Wold, 1980), and (2) PLS does not require the assumption that independent
variables are uncorrelated, since the technique lacks the assumptions and restrictions
of techniques that assume normally distributed data (Falk and Miller, 1992). However,
the coefficients provided by PLS are not by default the best least unbiased estimators
(BLUE). But with increased sample sizes, PLS estimates quickly converge on BLUE
(Fornell and Bookstein, 1982, Dijkstra, 1983). Furthermore, by using bootstrapping
(Efron and Tibshirani, 1993) it is possible to obtain t tests that are indicative of the
stability of the coefficients.
In sum, we selected PLS as a method for the following reasons:
(1) Our intent is to explore a theory that has heretofore seen limited testing.
(2) Our target population, and thus sample, is very small (Chin and Newsted, 1999).
(3) Our indicators are formative and reflective.
(4) Our theoretical variables are defined (Falk and Miller, 1992).
PLS divides a model into a series of blocks, each containing one dependent variable and
two or more independent variables. In a recursive or mediated theoretical model, the
dependent variable in one block may in turn be an independent variable within another
block. OLS regression is then used to estimate the parameters for each block, with the results
used as the basis for further iterations in the other blocks. This process continues as long as
successive iterations can reduce the error of the estimate and increase the explanatory power
of the model. The result is a set of coefficients with a percentage of the variation explained by
each theoretical construct in the model.
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In Step 2, the application of a bootstrapping algorithm to the PLS result allows us to
determine the stability and statistical significance of the coefficients linking the (a) manifest
to latent and (b) latent to latent constructs. The bootstrap procedure involves creating a large
number of equal-sized subsamples using random selection with replacement from the
original data sample. One thousand subsamples are usually sufficient for convergence to
BLUE (Hall, 1986; Booth and Sarkar, 1998). Each subsample is then used to generate a set
of coefficients using PLS, to which t tests are applied. Statistically significant t values
indicate that even with a large number of recombined existing data points there is enough
nonrandom variation in the data to yield stable coefficients for the predictors in the model.
In sum, PLS offers results with small data samples, does not require multivariate normality,
and converges on best least unbiased estimators with increasing sample size and statistically
significant results.12
7. Results
The best fit between the data and model is offered in Fig. 2. The model explains
39% of the variation for VC firms that pursue a portfolio diversification strategy and
76% of the variation for VC firms that pursued an active monitoring strategy. It is worth
noting that the active monitoring strategy construct involves three separate measures,
whereas portfolio diversification construct involves only two measures. This difference
partially explains the greater explanatory power of monitoring strategy, since we expect
explanatory power to increase as the number of measures increase. It is also worth
noting that the three measures of active monitoring strategy all have high loadings that
fall within a small range (.84, .87, and .88). This suggests that the three measures all
load heavily and almost uniformly onto the theoretical construct-activity monitoring
strategy, indicating a high level of construct and face validity. Fig. 3 provides the results
of the model using bootstrapping to test for the statistical significance (stability) of the
coefficients.
First, the relationship between affiliation status and the two VC risk management strategies
are not statistically significant (Fig. 3). Thus, H1a and H1b are not supported by the data.
Next, the relationship between performance pay and portfolio diversification has a magnitude
of 0.30 and is not statistically significant (t value of 1.15). The relationship between
performance pay and direct monitoring has a magnitude of 0.34 and is statistically significant
with a t value of 3.62 (Fig. 3). Thus, H2a is strongly supported by the data, whereas H2b is
not supported.
12 So why has its use been limited? This may be attributed to the initial inability to test for statistical
significance, computational intensive nature of the procedure and lack of user-friendly software. Developments in
bootstrapping allowed for the testing and verification of statistical significance. Later, Chin and Frye (1995) came
along with a user-friendly PC-based package to replace earlier software based on Loehmoeller (1981) work. Thus,
the barriers to using PLS have recently been overcome, rendering this method accessible to researchers who have
to explore nonnormally or symmetrically distributed data from small sample sizes.
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The relationship between share ownership by management and direct monitoring has a
magnitude of 0.43 and is statistically significant with a t statistic of 1.86. The relationship
between share ownership by management and diversification has a 0.84 magnitude and is
statistically significant with a t statistic of 2.45 (Fig. 3). Hence, H3a and H3b are supported by
the data.
In sum, the data moderately fit the theoretical model with support for 2a, H3a, and H3b. To
understand the phenomenon more completely and verify the stability of our model, we ran a
trimmed model based on the statistically significant coefficients. We confirmed the stability
of our results and although we do not report the model here, it is available from the authors.
Fig. 3. Full model with bootstrap 2000 subsamples. Note: T-value stated for statistically significant relations.
Fig. 2. Full model.
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8. Discussion and conclusions
This paper examined two risk management approaches used by JVC firms—portfolio
diversification and direct managerial monitoring—and the factors that determined how they
were chosen. From agency theory, we hypothesized that corporate affiliation, compensation
schemes for investment managers, and management equity ownership determined the
choice of risk management approach. The data show that both performance-based pay
and managerial ownership are positively related to direct managerial monitoring while
managerial ownership is negatively related to portfolio diversification. Although the final
effects are small, due in part to the sample size and the constrained model, our results
provide some support to the agency theory predictions. While our hypotheses on the
corporate affiliation were not supported, other important managerial incentive-based
hypotheses were supported, which provide another piece of empirical support to the
popular framework used in many U.S.-based studies on VC. Thus, our findings provide
some support for the use of standard agency theoretic formulations for non-U.S.-based VC
studies.
We theorized that an affiliated JVC would more likely adopt a passive risk management
approach since this reflects the strategic objectives of its larger parent, which in the Japanese
corporate context is focused on stabilizing rather than maximizing portfolio cash flows.
However, affiliation was not statistically related to risk management approaches and a closer
examination of the correlation table shows why. In fact, the correlation table (Table 2) and full
model (Fig. 2) report that JVCs affiliated to financial institutions or other corporate firms had
ownership and control structures typically associated with the portfolio risk reduction, rather
than value maximization, objectives of their parents. However, it was also highly correlated
with the more specific dimensions of ownership and control, implying that it may be
measuring the same thing. In hindsight, we should have expected this because it is unlikely
that affiliated JVCs could be structured as entrepreneurial units, with the implications for
radically different ownership and compensation systems. Basic organization theory suggests
that doing so in a culturally monolithic context (i.e., the Japanese corporation) would create
internal conflicts in the reward system, which could be severely disruptive to morale and
operational effectiveness. Thus, the only type of JVC that could adopt shareholder wealth
maximizing approaches would be the independent ones. In short, there was no variance in the
data between affiliation status and ownership and control, which accounts for the lack of
findings.
From a methodological standpoint, this study contributed to the entrepreneurship literature
by illustrating a method, structural equation modeling with PLS, that is well tested and
utilized in disciplines of management but is still relatively novel in entrepreneurship research.
PLS is particularly well suited to entrepreneurship research since it allows for structural
equation modeling in circumstances in which the data set is small and/or the assumption of
normally distributed data is unadvisable. Such is the case with much of entrepreneurship
research, particularly when the domain is constrained to specific industries or life stages but
where meaning statements of causality can be made. Here, the researcher is confronted with
either small data sets or variables that seriously violate the assumptions of normality, in either
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of these cases it is likely that the results have been, at best, considered with great suspicion.
Through the use of PLS nonnormal data or small data sets can now be used and the results
can be looked on with the same or greater confidence as studies based on larger data sets.
In terms of future research opportunities, extant studies in VC often suffer from the lack of
nuanced data, which can lead to gross generalizations. In this study, we attempted to obtain
finer grained data by conducting field interviews with venture capitalists but were still forced
to use binary measures for variables (e.g., compensation) that in other studies would have
contained more information. Our informants were simply not willing to be more specific
although the study (indeed most studies like it) could have benefited from higher quality
measures such as data on compensation contracts, portfolio structure, and even management
styles. The VC community around the world is known to be tight-lipped with an ethos that
puts a premium on access to private information as a competitive advantage in deal making.
This study points to the criticality of researcher credibility and personal networks. It suggests
that advances in VC research would mostly likely come from teams of researchers (e.g.,
Manigart et al., 2002) who can combine their personal networks to obtain field-based panel
data rather than those that rely solely on secondary data.
The managerial implication of our study is this: that venture capitalists should be as
concerned about the structure of their incentive systems for their fund managers as they are for
their investee-firm entrepreneurs. Agency theory says that contingent compensation is a self-
governing mechanism for individual effort that is difficult to measure and verify. However,
such schemes must be sensitive to the organizational context in which they are applied. When
organizational culture puts a premium on distributive justice, as it is the case with many large
Japanese corporations, some forms of contingent compensation such as equity ownership may
be difficult to implement. This may be particularly salient for JVCs that are affiliated with
other organizations. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that managerial incentives through
performance-based pay or ownership can affect a JVC’s choice of risk management approach.
In conclusion, our contribution to the research literature is a closer examination of the VC
firm and VC manager relationship. Whereas it has generally been assumed that an agency gap
exists between the VC firm and venture-backed entrepreneur, there appears to be an implicit
assumption in the literature that the interests of the VC firm and VC manager converge. We
built a model to test this and have shown that variations in compensation and ownership can
explain the variations in strategic choices of the managers. In conclusion, our study suggests
that general formulations of agency theory appear to operate just as well in the Japanese
relational exchange context as it does in the Anglo-American transactional exchange context.
Such approaches are particularly useful for modeling governance problems resulting from
information asymmetry, unequal risk bearing, and uncertain cash flows.
Acknowledgements
We thank the anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions on improving the
manuscript. The research has been partially supported by the John Broadbent Entrepreneurship
Research Grant at Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute. Errors and omissions are ours alone.
T. Yoshikawa et al. / Journal of Business Venturing 19 (2004) 831–849 847
References
Admati, A.R., Pfleiderer, P., 1994. Robust financial contracting and the role of venture capitalists. J. Finance
XLIX (2), 371–402.
Amihud, Y., Lev, B., 1981. Risk reduction as a managerial motive for conglomerate mergers. Bell J. Econ. 12,
605–617.
Baker, M., Gompers, P., 1999. An analysis of executive compensation, ownership and control in closely held
firms. Harvard Business School Working Paper, Cambridge, MA.
Baker, M., Gompers, P., 2000. The determinants of board structure and function in entrepreneurial firms. Harvard
Business School Working Paper, Cambridge, MA.
Bergemann, D., Hege, U., 1998. Dynamic venture capital financing, learning, and moral hazard. J. Bank. Financ.
22, 703–735.
Booth, J.G., Sarkar, S., 1998. Monte Carlo approximation of bootstrap variances. Am. Stat. 52, 354–363.
Cable, D.M., Shane, S., 1997. A prisoner’s dilemma approach to entrepreneur–venture capitalist relationship.
Acad. Manage. Rev. 22 (1), 142–176.
Chin, W.W., Frye, T.A., 1995. PLSGRAPH version 2.91.02.08. University of Calgary, Calgary.
Chin, W.W., Newsted, P.R., 1999. Structural equation modeling analysis with small samples using partial least
squares. In: Hoyle, R.H. (Ed.), Statistical Strategies for Small Sample Research. Sage, Thousand Oaks, CA.
Cumming, D., 2001. The determinants of venture capital portfolio size: empirical evidence. University of Alberta
Working Paper, Alberta, Canada.
Dijkstra, T., 1983. Some comments on maximum likelihood and partial least squares. J. Econom. XXII (1), 66–70.
Efron, B., Tibshirani, R.J., 1993. An Introduction to the Bootstrap. Chapman & Hall, New York.
Elango, B., Fried, V.E., Hisrich, R.D., Poloncheck, A., 1995. How venture capital firms differ. J. Bus. Venturing
10, 157–179.
Falk, R.F., Miller, N.B., 1992. A Primer for Soft Modelling. University of Akron Press, Akron, OH.
Fama, E., Jensen, M., 1983. Separation of ownership and control. J. Law Econ. 26, 301–325.
Fiet, J.O., 1995. Risk avoidance strategies in venture capital markets. J. Manage. Stud. 32 (4), 551–575.
Fornell, C., 1987. A second generation of multivariate analysis: classification of methods and implications for
marketing research. In: Houston, M.J. (Ed.), Review of Marketing. American Marketing Association, Chicago.
Fornell, C., Bookstein, F., 1982. A comparative analysis of two structural equation models: LISREL and PLS
applied to market data. In: Fornell, C. (Ed.), A Second Generation of Multivariate Analysis. Methods, vol. 1.
Praeger, New York.
Gittell, J.H., 2001. Supervisory span, relational coordination, and flight departure performance: a reassessment of
postbureaucracy theory. Organ. Sci. 12 (4), 468–483.
Gompers, P.A., 1995. Optimal investment, monitoring, and the staging of venture capital. J. Finance 50, 1461–1490.
Gompers, P.A., Lerner, J., 1999. The Venture Capital Cycle. MIT Press, Cambridge, MA.
Gompers, P.A., Lerner, J., 2001a. The venture capital revolution. J. Econ. Perspect. 15 (2), 145–168.
Gompers, P.A., Lerner, J., 2001b. The Money of Invention: How Venture Capital Creates New Wealth. Harvard
Business School Press, Boston.
Gorman, M., Sahlman, W.A., 1989. What do venture capitalists do? J. Bus. Venturing 4, 231–248.
Grossman, S.J., Hart, O.D., 1986. The costs and benefits of ownership: a theory of vertical and lateral integration.
J. Polit. Econ. 50 (4), 691–720.
Gupta, A.K., Sapienza, H.J., 1992. Determinants of venture capital firm’s preferences regarding the industry
diversity and geographic scope of their investments. J. Bus. Venturing 7, 347–362.
Hall, P., 1986. On the number of bootstrap simulations required to construct a confidence interval. Ann. Stat. 14,
1453–1462.
Hamada, Y., 1998. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru (Venture Capital in Japan), 2nd ed. Nihon Keizai Shimbunsha,
Tokyo.
Hamada, Y., 2001. Nihon no Bencha Kyapitaru no Genkyo (Current State of Japanese Venture Capital). Paper
presented at the Nihon Bencha Gakkai (Venture Capital Seminar), May 7, Tokyo, Japan.
T. Yoshikawa et al. / Journal of Business Venturing 19 (2004) 831–849848
Harmon, S., 2000. Zero Gravity: Riding Venture Capital from High-Tech Start-Up to Break Out IPO (Japanese
version translated and commentary inserted by K. Muraguchi). Soft Bank Publishing, Tokyo.
Hart, O.D., Moore, J., 1990. Property rights and the nature of the firm. J. Polit. Econ. 98 (6), 1119–1159.
Hata, N., Higashide, H., 2000. Bencha fainansu no genjo to VC no yakuwari (Current State of VC Finance and
Role of VC). In: Waseda University Entrepreneur Research Group, H. (Ed.), Venture Kigyo no Keiei to Shien,
pp. 135–168.
Hill, C.W., Snell, S., 1989. The effects of ownership structure and control on corporate productivity. Acad.
Manage. J. 32, 25–46.
Hudley, G., Jacobson, C.K., 1998. The effects of the keiretsu on the export performance of Japanese companies:
help or hindrance? Strateg. Manage J. 19 (10), 927–937.
Ivancevich, J.M., 2001. Human Resource Management, 8th ed. McGraw-Hill, New York.
Ja¨a¨skela¨inen, M., Maula, M., Seppa¨, T., 2002. The optimal portfolio of start-up firms in venture capital finance:
the moderating effect of syndication and an empirical test. Paper presented at the Twenty-Second Annual
Babson–Kauffman Entrepreneurship Research Conference, 5–8 June, Boulder, CO.
Jensen, M.C., 1984. Takeovers: folklore and science. Harv. Bus. Rev. 62 (6), 109–122.
Jensen, M., 1993. The modern industrial revolution: exit, and the failure of internal control systems. J. Finance 48,
831–880.
Jensen, M., Meckling, W., 1976. Theory of the firm: managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure.
J. Financ. Econ. 3, 305–360.
Kaplan, S.N., Stromberg, P., 2002. Financial contracting theory meets the real world: an empirical analysis of
venture capital contracts. University of Chicago Working Paper, Chicago, IL.
Lerner, J., 1995. Venture capitalists and the oversight of private firms. J. Finance 50 (1), 301–319.
Loehmoeller, J., 1981. LVPLS 1.6 program manual: latent variables path analysis with partial least squares
estimation. Universitaet zu Koehn, Zentralarchiv fuer Empirische Sozialforschung, Cologne, Germany.
MacMillan, I.C., Kulow, D.M., Khoylian, R., 1988. Venture capitalists’ involvement in their investments: extent
and performance. J. Bus. Venturing 4, 27–47.
Manigart, S., Joos, P., De Vos, D., 1994. The performance of publicly traded European venture capital companies.
J. Small Bus. Finance 3 (2), 111–125.
Manigart, S., De Waele, K., Wright, M., Robbie, K., Desbrieres, P., Sapienza, H.J., Beekman, A., 2002. Deter-
minants of required return in venture capital investments: a five-country study. J. Bus. Venturing 17, 291–312.
McConnell, J.J., Servaes, H., 1990. Additional evidence on equity ownership and corporate value. J. Financ.
Econ. 20 (2), 595–613.
Nakatani, I., 1984. The economic role of financial corporate grouping. In: Aoki, M. (Ed.), The Economic Analysis
of the Japanese Firm, pp. 227–258.
Prowse, S.D., 1996. The economics of private equity market. Econ. Rev. (Dallas, Tex.), 21–34 (3rd Quarter).
Robbie, K., Wright, M., Chiplin, B., 1997. The monitoring of venture capital firms. Entrep. Theory Pract., 9–28
(Summer).
Sahlman,W.A., 1990. The structure and governance of venture-capital organizations. J. Financ. Econ. 27, 473–521.
Sapienza, H.J., Gupta, A.K., 1994. Impact of agency risks and task uncertainty on venture capitalists. Acad.
Manage. J. 376, 1618–1632.
Sapienza, H.J., Manigart, S., Vermeir, W., 1996. Venture capitalist governance and value added in four countries.
J. Bus. Venturing 11, 439–469.
Sullivan, J.J., 1992. Invasion of the Salarymen: The Japanese Business Presence in America. Praeger, New York.
Sweeting, R.C., Wong, C.F., 1997. A UK ‘hands-off’ venture capital firm and the handling of post-investment
investor– investee relationships. J. Manage. Stud. 34 (1), 125–152.
Wold, H., 1980. Factors affecting the outcome of economic sanctions: an application of soft modelling. Paper
presented at the Fourth World Congress of Econometric Society, 1–3 May, Aix-en-provence, France.
Wright, M., Robbie, K., 1998. Venture capital and private equity: a review and synthesis. J. Bus. Finance Account.
25 (5–6), 521–570.
T. Yoshikawa et al. / Journal of Business Venturing 19 (2004) 831–849 849
